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Abstract
Using information in the household consumption data as a signal of secularity, this
study explores the e¤ect of religion on female labor force participation (FLFP) in a Muslim-
dominated country, Turkey. A household is categorized as secular if its members report
that they consume goods that contradict conservative Islamic practices. This information
is then used in FLFP estimations. The results show that living in a secular household has
a positive and highly signicant e¤ect on the probability of labor market participation of
married women in urban areas. Secularity is also associated with a reduced probability
of unpaid work, which is the most widespread form of female employment in rural ar-
eas. For single women, most of whom are in the school-age, the estimations also provide
weaker evidence regarding the positive e¤ect of secularity on the probability of educational
participation and paid work.
Keywords: Consumption, female labor force participation, religion.
JEL-codes: J16, Z12
1 Introduction
This paper examines the e¤ect of religion on female labor force participation (FLFP). Various
studies investigate the factors determining FLFP in countries with diverse religious composi-
tions and development levels1; yet, the role of religious devoutness or of di¤erences across faiths
remains underexplored. One possible underlying reason is the lack of micro-level data which
contains joint information on religious tendencies and other variables that a¤ect participation.
Data scarcity on religion is severe especially for those societies in which asking individuals
about faith-based questions is a challenge. This study uses the information provided in the
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the XXVIII National Conference of Labour Economics,
Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido CarliRoma, 27-28 September 2013. The author
would like to thank the session participants for their valuable suggestions.
yAnkara University. E-mail: kkizilca@law.ankara.edu.tr.
1Joumette (2003) and Pettit and Hooke (2005) provide multi-country analyses of FLFP in western/developed
countries. For MENA region, see Moghadam (1998), and Spierings et al. (2010).
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consumption data of a Muslim-dominated country, Turkey, to observe if a household con-
sumes those goods that are considered as haram (prohibited) or makruh (disliked) according
to the orthodox (Sunni) interpretations of Islam. Using information on consumption as a sign
of secularity, this study asks if keeping a distance from conservative Sunni Islam practices
a¤ects the labor market participation of women.
It is commonly perceived that Islam prohibits consumption of alcoholic beverages and
pork meat. Depending on the sect of Islam, further restrictions may apply and some common
rules may be overlooked. For example, conservative Muslim families usually do not consume
pet products as they abstain from feeding pets in their homes. Similarly, devout followers of
the Hane sect, which is the most common branch of Sunni Islam in Turkey, consider the
consumption of any seafood except for sh as makruh2. On the other hand, Alevis do not
necessarily abstain from these products, as they have a more liberal approach to religious
practices3. Thus, contradicting the widespread impression of Islam as a religion that imposes
uniform rules for daily life, consumption patterns may vary substantially between religious
and secular individuals as well as across di¤erent congregations.
Despite e¤orts in recent years at both the governmental and the municipal levels to limit
production and sales of alcoholic beverages, these products have widely and legally been
available in Turkey, especially in urban areas. Similarly, shellsh consumption, with its all
varieties, is also common, mostly along the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts, in the greater
Istanbul region, and even in the landlocked city of Ankara. Moreover, consumption of pet
products increases as pet feeding becomes more common in urban areas. This diversity
in consumption patterns reects the secular lifestyle that a non-negligible fraction of the
population pursues in Turkey.
The innovative empirical strategy proposed in this paper stems from the idea that the
consumption data on sinful goods in the household surveys provide us with valuable in-
formation about a households secularity in a Muslim society. The use of consumption data
serves as a proxy to micro-level information on religion, provided that purchases of religious or
prohibited goods/services are recorded in the surveys. Faith-based consumption may include
money spent on religious books/objects, livestock to sacrice (as recorded in the Moroccan
Household and Youth Survey of 2009-2010), or alcoholic drinks in Muslim-dominated societies
2For a socio-anthropological account of seafood consumption and its relation with religion in Turkey, see
Knudsen (2006).
3Statistics are not reliable as to the number of followers of each religious sect in Turkey. According to
estimates, Alevis compose 10 to 25 percent of the total population of Turkey (See Erman & Göker, 2006: 99;
and Shankland, 2003: 20).
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(as recorded in Turkish Household surveys or Iraqi Household Socio-Economic Survey of 2007).
While the current paper limits its scope to the e¤ect of secularity on FLFP, its methodology
can extend to any other micro-level research in which information on religiosity/secularity has
an explanatory value.
Matching information on a households secularity with individual characteristics has a
unique advantage in those cases where men in the household inuence womens participatory
decisions. A fraction of the 15 to 25 percent of women who are out of the labor force in Turkey
declare that their male relatives prevent them from working (Gündüz-Hos¸gör and Smits, 2008;
·Ilkkaracan, 2012). It is also likely that a sizeable number of women who dont work would
not even bother to ask permissionof the males in the household or to think of working due
to the traditional roles within their conservative environments. In such cases, the method
proposed in this paper has a potential to perform better than the analyses based on data
obtained from surveys conducted solely on individual women.
In another contribution, this paper deconstructs the e¤ect of secularity on womens par-
ticipatory decisions in the paid/unpaid work dichotomy4. The prevalence of unpaid female
employment in agriculture is a documented dimension of the Turkish labor market. As a
result, any factor that a¤ects FLFP may have a di¤erent sign and a magnitude in urban and
rural areas. Moreover, changes in FLFP within rural locations demand a cautious interpreta-
tion on normative grounds, since in many cases womens unpaid economic activities support
the paid leisure of men, which is rarely the case in urban areas. The analyses carried out
in this study show that household secularity -which is measured by declared consumption of
haram and makruh- has a highly signicant positive e¤ect on the married womens labor-force
participation in urban areas, where the majority of population is located and paid labor is
employed. In contrast, the e¤ect of secularity on FLFP in rural areas is negative due to lower
incidences of unpaid female work within secular households in agriculture.
In a nal contribution, this study explores the relationship between household secularity
and educational participation for the single, younger group of women who are in the school age.
The previous studies on the determinants of womens labor market participation in Turkey
highlights the importance of education, especially higher education, more than any other
personal characteristic (see Section 2.3). Results from this study provide evidence supporting
the positive e¤ect of secular consumption on educational participation. Yet, the robustness
4A recent work by Spierings (2014) makes a similar contribution by analyzing the e¤ect of Islam on alter-
native forms of womens employment. However, the author groups housewives and women involved in unpaid
farm work in a single category, which is not the case in this study.
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checks indicate that a part of this e¤ect is attributable to the luxurious nature of secular
goods in Turkey.
2 Religious Denominations, Devoutness, and FLFP: Previous
Findings
Previous studies considering the e¤ect of religion on FLFP investigate the subject in two -not
necessarily mutually exclusive- ways. Firstly, alternative denominations (or sects) may dene
di¤erent economic roles for women in social life. As the below summary shows, the situation
of women in Islam stands as the most controversial issue in this stream of discussions. Alter-
natively, one may investigate the role of religiosity in the determination of FLFP, regardless
of denominations. Studies using econometric methodology which are cited below tend to fa-
vor the idea that religiosity in general has a negative e¤ect on FLFP. However, this section
also cites a number of anthropological studies with ndings that contradict the econometric
evidence. Such research asserts involvement in religious networks and practices may function
as prerequisites of womens economic participation at rural or community levels. Thus, a
positive correlation between religious activities and labor market participation of women also
stands as a probable social outcome. In connection with these discussions, the next section
of the current study explores the aggregate e¤ect of secularity on FLFP in rural Turkey.
In this section, I summarize and place into two categories the ndings of previous studies
that investigated the e¤ect of religious denominations and religiosity on FLFP. The rst group
of studies investigates the causal link between religion and FLFP using cross-country data.
A usual variable of interest in this group is an indicator of FLFP rate (either in absolute
terms or as a ratio to male participation rate), while the ratio of each religions followers
-or a categorical variable showing each countrys religious majority- are among explanatory
variables. A second group analyzes individual-level data from certain countries or religious
groups. This latter approach is advantageous, as it relies on higher number of observations,
more detailed information on individual characteristics which a¤ect FLFP, and indicators of
religious preferences at the individual level.
2.1 Studies Using Aggregated Data
In multi-country studies, the role of Islam in womens economic and/or political participation
stands as the most contentious topic. Much of the controversy arises from the di¢ culties in
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separating the e¤ects of religion from other covariates, such as level of development, depen-
dency in trade, or oil revenues in the determination of womens participation. The level of
development a¤ects FLFP mainly through shaping the production structure of an economy.
Economic growth, in general, acts as a demand factor for labor, which might also increase
female employment. However, certain industries which are associated with economic growth
such as iron and steel works, construction, mining, etc. are highly male-dominated. Thus,
depending on the sectoral distribution of industries, development may exert either a posi-
tive or a U-shaped a¤ect on FLFP. Furthermore, the growth path of developing countries
may di¤er from the industrialized ones, due to the pre-mature growth of the services sector
in these countries. All these linkages between development level and FLFP complicates the
identication of the e¤ect of religion on FLFP. Early studies which address these issues in-
clude Marshall (1985), Pampel and Tanaka (1986), and Clark et al. (1991). Among them,
Marshall (1985) and Clark et al. (1991) reach similar results, asserting that once cultural fac-
tors (measured by regional dummy variables) are included in the estimations, the magnitude
and the signicance of the e¤ect of economic dependency diminishes. Both studies conclude
that the low FLFP rates observed in Muslim-majority nations are not fully explained by the
countriesmodes of incorporation into the world system or their development levels. Pampel
and Tanaka (1986) also stress that regional e¤ects have explanatory power, but their e¤ects
do not reduce the role of economic development in the determination of female participation.
They also highlight the U-shaped impact of development on participation rate.
Among the most inuential authors on the issue of the relationship among development,
Islam, and FLFP are Inglehart and Norris (2003). The authors connect Islamic culture and
gender equality. However, in their analysis, culture functions as an endogenous variable
through which the e¤ect of an economys structure is transmitted into gendered outcomes.
Thus, they assert that the patriarchal culture prevailing in Muslim societies will change as
these countries move to a post-industrial stage of development.
In contrast, Ross (2008) challenges this modernization approach of Inglehart and Norris,
arguing that natural resources, more precisely oil, and not religion causes female participa-
tion to stand at its current low levels in the Middle East. Discovery and export of oil causes
a countrys real exchange rate to valuate (Dutch disease) which, in turn, causes a shift of
the domestic production towards the non-tradables sector (e.g. construction), because either
tradables become cheaper to import or the non-tradables have a higher elasticity of demand
with respect to income. Traditionally, the female labor-force is concentrated in the tradables
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sector, for which the demand decreases following the valuation of the exchange rate. Thus,
natural-resource exports are not gender-neutral in terms of their e¤ect on labor demand. Ross
supports his arguments by running panel and cross-national regressions for 161 countries in
which indicators of female economic and political participation are used as dependent vari-
ables. Among his explanatory variables are dummies for Middle Eastern and North African
(MENA) countries and post-communist countries, the share of Muslims in each country, and
a variable measuring per capita oil exports revenue. The oil coe¢ cient is negative and highly
signicant in all estimations, indicating that oil exports have a curseon womens participa-
tion in oil-exporting countries. The coe¢ cient of Islam, on the other hand, is not statistically
signicant. Based on these ndings, the author concludes that religion is not an explanatory
factor of womens low participation rates in Muslim-dominated countries.
Rossdecision to include in the regressions both a variable for the fraction of Muslims
in each country and a dummy for MENA countries might have driven the results for the
e¤ect of religion on female participation. By using a dummy for MENA countries, the author
implicitly presumes that there is something peculiar to these countries that drives the impact
of oil revenues on womens participation, which has nothing to do with the religion. However,
drawing a conclusion on the e¤ect of Islam by taking 17 MENA countries as a special case
might require some justication, a concern which is not addressed in the article.
A number of authors replicate Ross methodology to test his hypothesis, which holds
the oil as the culprit of gender inequality in MENA countries. Among them, Haghighat-
Sordellini (2009) conrms Rosscontention regarding the negative e¤ect of oil exports on the
participation rates. However, even after accounting for the e¤ect of oil revenues, the e¤ect
of the share of Muslim population in each country remains negatively signicant. This latter
conclusion does not replicate Rossndings. Haghighat-Sordellini (2009) points to patriarchy
(measured by the religions role in state formation and the political role of women) as the
main contributor for low levels of female participation in the Middle Eastern countries.
Spierings et al. (2009) produced another study which examines the relationships among
Islam, development, and oil. The authors emphasize the drastic variations of FLFP across
Muslim-dominated countries and explore the underlying reasons for them. Unlike the above-
mentioned studies which suggest a negative (or non-existing) relation between oil exports and
participation, the ndings of Spierings et al. assert that the e¤ect of oil exports on FLFP
is actually positive, because of its impact on economic development. While addressing the
positive e¤ects of democracy and economic development on female participation, their ndings
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also indicate that participation rates decrease as states diverge from secularism.
Using country-level data, Bayanpourtehrani and Sylwester (2012) regress various female
labor force participation indicators on the shares of each religions followers (mainly Muslims,
Hindus, Catholics, Protestants, and non-believers) in each countrys population and other
control variables. When the Muslim share of a population is used as the only explanatory
variable, the authors conclude that Islam has a strong negative e¤ect on FLFP. As a second
step, the authors include regional dummies in the regressions following the above-mentioned
methodology of Ross (2008). After controlling for regions, the coe¢ cient of Islam becomes
smaller and loses its signicance. To further evaluate this nding, Bayanpourtehrani and
Sylwester (2012) run the same regressions by excluding MENA countries from the sample.
The results indicate a di¤erence between MENA and other countries with regard to the e¤ect
of Islam on female participation. The coe¢ cient of Islam remains signicant for the MENA
region, but becomes insignicant for the rest of the sample.
In summary, the previous literature reveals little agreement concerning the e¤ect of religion
on FLFP among studies that use aggregated data. The only observation agreed upon by all
country-level studies concerns the lower levels of FLFP in the Muslim societies - particularly
in the MENA region. However, the explanations with respect to the underlying reasons of
lower FLFP levels strongly contradict with each other, especially regarding the role of religion
as a contributing factor.
2.2 Studies Using Individual-Level Data
In addition to exploring the di¤erences across religious denominations, micro-level studies
investigate the e¤ect of religiosity on FLFP. An early example of this latter group of stud-
ies is o¤ered by Morgan and Scanzoni (1987). Based on the results of a questionnaire that
they administer to 318 senior white female college students in the USA, the authors conclude
that religious devotion signicantly lowers studentsfuture plans for paid work. In another
example, Read (2004) explores the importance of both religious a¢ liation and devotion in
workforce participation of Arab-American women in the United States. She concludes that
while religiosity has a negative impact on participation in general, there is no signicant dif-
ference between Christian and Muslim Arab women in their labor force participation. In
their study of Jewish minority in the USA, Hartman & Hartman (1996) reach similar results
regarding the negative e¤ect of religiosity on womens economic activity. In the same vein,
Spierings (2014) develops similar arguments regarding the e¤ects of both religion (Islam) and
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religiosity on womens employment. Moreover, Spierings challenges the aforementioned mod-
ernization approach of Inglehart by comparing womens employment decisions across Muslim
populations and other a¢ liations in Nigeria and Indonesia. He asserts that traditionalism
within all religious groups serves as a better explanatory factor than religious denomination
when determining womens employment in these multi-religious countries.
Di¤erences across Christian congregations with regard to their e¤ects are also investigated
by a number of studies. Among them, Murphys study (1995) conducts separate analyses for
single women and married couples in Ireland. Regarding single women, he nds that being a
Catholic reduces the probability of labor-force participation 2:7 percentage points, compared
to the Protestants and others. As a second step, the author estimates the e¤ect of religion
on the labor market status of both men and women in a multinomial logistic setting. He
concludes that Catholicism lowers the probability of employment for both women and men,
while the e¤ect for the latter is much stronger. Similarly, Lehrer (1995) explores the e¤ects
of religious congregations on womens employment in the United States. Her study covers
ecumenical Protestant, exclusivist Protestant, and Catholic families, as well as families with
no religious a¢ liation. Other religious groups, such as Jews, Mormons, and Muslims are
excluded. She explores not only the e¤ect of womens religious preferences, but also the e¤ect
of inter-faith marriages on their employment status. The ndings suggest that the e¤ect of
religious choice on employment varies depending on the existence of children under 6 years
of age within the household. Among the cohort of families with younger children, Catholic
women in homogamous marriages and Protestant women in inter-faith marriages have higher
probabilities of employment compared to the Protestant women who are married to husbands
of the same faith.
Inspired by Lehrers work, Heineck (2004) investigates the e¤ects of both religious a¢ l-
iation and intensity on the probability of employment for the women in the German labor
market. The results indicate substantial variations across religious a¢ liations and inter-faith
marriages with regard to their e¤ects on female employment. Regarding women in Muslim
marriages, Heineck nds Islamic a¢ liation to have a strong negative e¤ect on employment
probability compared to both Catholicism and Protestantism. The author also suggests that,
regardless of spousal faith, religious devoutness for Muslim women has a statistically signi-
cant negative e¤ect on the odds of being employed compared to women of other a¢ liations.
Two other authors who study cross-religious di¤erences and its e¤ect on the status of the
womens labor-market status are Amin and Alam (2008). Using survey data from Malaysia
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for the years 1988 and 1989, Amin and Alams research analyzes the e¤ects of religion on
womens employment and their choice between part-time and full-time work. Their results
indicate signicantly lower probabilities of work for married Muslim women compared to
Buddhists and Hindus in rural areas and for single Muslim women compared to Buddhists
in all areas. Additionally, in rural areas, married Hindu women have a higher likelihood of
working full-time than the Muslim women.
In brief, micro-data research share common ground with country-level studies which pre-
dominantly conclude that Islamic a¢ liation has a decreasing e¤ect on womens employment.
However, certain studies which distinguish religious denominations and religiosity such as
Read (2004) and Spierings (2014) oppose this argument as they assert that the negative e¤ect
of religiosity on womens employment remains valid regardless of denominations.
Contrary to the ndings of micro-econometric studies regarding the negative e¤ect of reli-
giosity on womens work, a number of anthropological studies conducted in Turkey suggest a
positive relationship between pious practices and womens economic activity in rural or con-
servative areas. Hart (2007) and Isik (2013) assert that, in smaller villages or religious urban
communities, piety functions as a legitimizing tool for womens economic engagement, which
is normally not welcomed because of its association with longer hours spent outside home.
Furthermore, according to the authors, piety emerges as a soothing apparatus against local
inequalities that arise with the development of rural small-scale industries, such as carpet-
weaving or olive oil production, in which female labor holds a substantial share. Similarly,
Grünenfelder (2013), who benet from narratives of educated Pakistani women working in
rural development sector, suggest that these women feel social pressures to represent them-
selves as decent Muslims in order to signal that they are not morally inferior people. In all
these cases, demonstrated religious acts function as legitimizing tools for womens economic
participation in rural areas. Depending on the prevalence of such cases, the aggregate e¤ect
of religiosity on womens workforce participation may become obscure or even positive in
agrarian settings.
2.3 FLFP in Turkey
In 2009 and 2010, the World Bank and State Planning Organization of Turkey led a series of
publications analyzing the long term trends and determinants of FLFP in Turkey. World Bank
(2009) provides an extensive summary on both the ndings of the background papers that
contributed the project (i.e. Day¬o¼glu and K¬rdar, 2010; Uraz et al., 2010; and Taymaz, 2010)
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and the other previous studies on the subject. All of these studies highlight two stylized facts
about the Turkish case, namely, surprisingly low level of FLFP and its decreasing trend in long
term. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) statistics, FLFP in 2010 was
28%, which places Turkey at the lowest sixteenth among 188 countries in the dataset and lies
well below the averages of EU (50%) and OECD (51%). Moreover, the level of FLFP in 2010
was already driven up by two independent external dynamics. Firstly, there was an added-
worker e¤ectas a result of the great recession. And secondly, Turkish government initiated
a subsidy program in 2008 which aimed at fostering womens and youngstersemployment
(see. Day¬o¼glu and K¬rdar, 2010, p.11).
The decline in the FLFP rate over the past decades remains one of the most important
concerns of the gender literature in Turkey. FLFP was as high as 35% in 1990. The above-
mentioned studies highlight two driving factors behind the signicant fall in womens economic
participation. Firstly, depending on the year, participation rates in rural areas has been 10
to 20 percentage points higher than the urban places. Massive migration from rural areas
to the cities during this period caused the women to fall out of the labor force and resulted
in a stagnation of FLFP rate in urban areas. The decline in the job-creating capacity of
agriculture, where a great percentage of women in rural areas are employed, remains a second
source behind the fall in the FLFP rate. Tansel (2002) as well as the above mentioned
studies assert that womens economic participation in Turkey falls as a result of the U-shaped
relationship between industrialization/urbanization and FLFP.
A growing number of studies in recent years explores the role of patriarchy and conser-
vatism in Turkey to explain the low and falling rates of female participation. Gündüz-Hos¸gör
and Smits (2008) conclude that women with traditional gender attitudes have lower proba-
bilities of employment in formal jobs. In the same vein, Uraz et al. (2010) nd that women
whose marriages are arranged by their families have signicantly lower participation rates
in urban locations, but higher in the rural areas. Another study which considers cultural
values in the analysis is provided by ·Ilkkaracan (2012). The author considers both demand
and supply side factors that a¤ect womens participation in the labor market. Concerning
the supply side factors, she draws her ndings from a survey conducted in a working-class
region of Istanbul and asserts that conservative gender roles have a signicant e¤ect on the low
levels of participation rates of urban women. Similarly, using data from the 2006 Household
Structure Survey conducted by Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT), which contains
information on conservative values and religiosity, Göksel (2013) shows that a wifes share of
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income within a family is negatively correlated with a households patriarchal attitudes and
religious devoutness.
Throughout these studies, the rural-urban dichotomy is a common issue when determin-
ing FLFP. Explanatory variables that a¤ect participation in urban areas might loose their
signicance or have reversed a¤ects in rural areas. The main underlying reason is the fact
that the majority of women living in rural Turkey engage in unpaid labor (Day¬o¼glu and
K¬rdar, 2010). Commonly, women in rural Turkey work in the elds while their husbands
gather in their spare time and meet in the co¤eehouses of the village5. Despite the womens
e¤orts, their husbands remain the recipient of crop revenues. For this reason, the World Bank
(2009:16) considers the falling rate of FLFP in rural areas to not necessarily be a bad
thing. The analysis carried through the following sections both reinforces the results reached
in the previous literature on this rural/urban dichotomy and moves beyond it by investigating
the e¤ect of secularity on paid employment in both areas.
3 Data, Variables and Method
The data used in this study comes from the 2003 Household Survey, which was conducted by
TURKSTAT. The survey consists of three sets of questionnaires, which include information
on household consumption, household characteristics and wealth, as well as data on individual
characteristics. This study benets from the information from all three datasets. I choose
to use the 2003 survey, as it is the only one -among all household surveys- which provides
data at the NUTS1 and NUTS2 regional levels6. Controlling for the regional e¤ects is of
importance, as FLFP rates and the share of households with secular consumption patterns
exhibit strong and similar regional patterns, as seen in Figure 1. Including regional e¤ects in
the analysis allows us to separate the e¤ects of secular consumption from other driving factors
behind FLFP, such as the distribution of industries and services across regions or other ethno-
cultural inuences that di¤ers from one region to another7. Moreover, TURKSTAT set the
5The following is a quote from a 24-year old married female villager from a very eastern province of I¼gd¬r,
who was interviewed in 1984 by Morvaridi (1992:579): [...]men did not hoe because they knew it was hard
work and therefore they preferred to let their women do it, while they played cards.
6NUTS (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) is the Eurostats method of divid-
ing up the EUs economic territories. For Turkey, NUTS1 and NUTS2 correspond to 12
regions and 26 subregions, respectively. For more information on NUTS classication see
<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction>. Visited: 6 May
2014.
7See Gündüz-Hos¸gör and Smits (2008) about the e¤ect of ethnicity on FLFP and Tansel (2002) on the
persistence of regional e¤ects in Turkey.
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sampling size for the 2003 survey at 25; 920 households, which is exceptionally high compared
to the surveys of other years.
3.1 Variables
The dependent variable used in study, FLFP, is a categorical one, taking the value one if the
female in question is in the labor force at the time when the survey was conducted or zero
otherwise. Being in the labor force means working (even for one hour) paid (for a pecuniary or
a non-pecuniary income) or unpaid in the month of the survey or searching for such a job. In
other words, labor force participants considered in this study include three groups of people,
namely, paid workers, unpaid workers (who mostly work in family enterprises in agriculture)
and the unemployed. Unpaid work does not cover domestic duties.
I dene a household as secularif its members declare that they consume any alcoholic
beverages, shellsh, or pet products8. I do not take into consideration the total amount of
money spent on these goods; so even a single bottle of beer or a small amount of shrimps
bought in the survey period signies secularity. This denition has both its advantages and
limitations. One limitation arises from the underreported amount of alcohol purchases. Total
sales of alcoholic drinks in Turkey far exceed the consumption amount declared in the house-
hold surveys9. One probable reason behind this disparity is the social desirability bias in the
answers. It is common in Turkey that people hesitate to pronounce publicly their consumption
of alcohol. Especially in smaller locations, grocery stores that sell alcohol usually wrap and
hence disguise the bottle. A second disparity arises as a result of the alcohol consumed in bars
or restaurants, which are registered in di¤erent categories (such as restaurant services) in the
survey. In any case, the inferences that I will draw in the next section using this consumption
data will be downward biased, as part of the population which is not categorized as secular
also includes households which consume alcohol but do not declare so in the survey. Fortu-
nately, in the section on household characteristics, the survey contains another question that
allows us to cross-check alcohol consumption. Specically, the respondents are asked if there
is any person within the household that has a drinking habit. Some households positively
8 In the 2003 questionnaire no household declares the consumption of pork meat. Pork meat is only available
in certain supermarkets of the largest Turkish cities.
9The total estimated value of declared beer consumption in the survey is 50; 400; 000 liras which corre-
sponds to 20; 160; 000 liters at the 2003 price of 1,25 lira per half-liter bottle. According to the data of the
Tobacco and Alcohol Market Regulatory Authority of 2003, the total amount of beer sold in 2003 was actually
480 million liters, which is as 24 times as high the reported amount in the household survey. Data source:
<http://www.tapdk.gov.tr/alkol/istatistik/alkollu_icki_piyasa_arz_2003_2010.xls>. Reached: 03.04.2013
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reply to this question even if household members do not declare spending money on alcoholic
drinks in the consumption section of the survey. The opposite case also holds true, i.e. some
households which consume alcohol reply to the question negatively. This latter discrepancy
may arise if a households members consume alcohol occasionally but refuse to dene this
behavior as habitual. In any case, asking questions on alcohol consumption in two di¤erent
sections of the survey increases the quality of the data.
The measure of secularity used in this study also has a shortcoming due to its categorical
nature, as it cannot account for the within-group variations regarding intensityof secularity.
Despite this limitation, there is still one important advantage for using a categorical variable:
In a setting where consumption of the prohibited goods is an explanatory, and FLFP is
the dependent variable, the issue of two-way causality would emerge if the variable secular
is dened as a continuous one. In such a case, a correlation between the two would indicate
the e¤ect of an additional persons employment within the household on total alcohol con-
sumption, rather than measuring the e¤ect of secularity on FLFP. The possibility of reverse
causality ceases to be an issue when a categorical variable is used to measure secularity, as it
is not reasonable to expect an abstainer family to begin drinking alcohol or to start feeding a
dog after a female in the household nds a new job.
One possible objection to the way in which the paper denes secularity is that a household
consuming these above-mentioned goods may still be religious if its members belong to another
religion such as Christianity. Even if households fall into this category, the resulting measuring
bias would still be negligible, as 99.9 percent of the people in Turkey declare themselves to
be Muslims, according to the World Values Survey data of 2007. World Christian Database
reports the same gure as 98.2 percent10.
Although it is not statistically documentable because of data unavailability, the way in
which the term secularis dened in this study may also reect di¤erences between Sunni and
Alevi practices to a certain extent. As mentioned in the Introduction, Alevis in Turkey di¤er
from Sunnis substantially not only in the practice religion but also in their secular lifestyle.
The list of haram goods or actions can be very lengthy in conservative Sunni practices such
as alcohol, pork meat, and shellsh, as well as feeding pets at homes, drawing and sculpting
human gures, dancing etc. For women, additional restrictions apply, including singing,
laughing loudly, showing their hair in public. Moreover, in some cases, women are not allowed
10 I obtained these gures from the institutions websites: <www.worldvaluessurvey.org> and
<www.worldchristiandatabase.org>. Reached: 28.03.2013.
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to prey in Mosques unless there exists a designated area for them. On the contrary, most
of these restrictions do not hold in Alevi practices11. Thus, the term secular refers both
non-religious Sunnis and followers of any other non-orthodox sects.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the fraction of households which consume any of the secular goods under
study, namely, alcohol, shellsh and pet products. The reported consumption of pet supplies
(2:7 percent in urban areas) and especially shellsh (0:14 percent in urban areas) are too low to
allow separate estimations for each product group. A probable reason behind the low level of
reported shellsh consumption is that shellsh is rarely prepared within Turkish homes, thus,
consumption of shellsh is categorized under the heading of restaurant services. Additionally,
Table 1 reports per capita disposable income, average number of children younger than 15
years of age per household, and household types, variables that are used in estimations found
in the next section concerning womens participation.
Table 1: Estimated Means for Household Characteristics
Rural Urban Total
Consuming alcohol 0.0637 0.0948 0.0826
Consuming shellsh 0.0003 0.0014 0.0010
Buying pet products 0.0068 0.0266 0.0188
Secular (any of the above three) 0.0691 0.1163 0.0978
Per capita income (0 000 TL) 0.1664 0.2558 0.2207
# of children under 15 1.9825 1.4600 1.6650
Hhtype: Nuclear 0.5941 0.7224 0.6721
Hhtype: Large 0.3646 0.2190 0.2761
Hhtype: Single adult 0.0396 0.0527 0.0476
Hhtype: other 0.0017 0.0058 0.0042
N 34582 73032 107614
N_pop 27151784 42043781 69195565
In addition to household characteristics, results presented the next section include variables
on individuals. Table 2 shows mean values of these variables as well as the percentage of women
in the labor force. FLFP is 24 percentage points higher in the rural areas. However, according
to the survey estimates, 76 percent of the working women between 15 and 64 years of age in
rural areas work unpaid in the family enterprises (small farms), as discussed in the previous
section. In urban areas, the same ratio is 10 percent, only. Thus, any interpretation of FLFP
11For detailed information on the Alevis in Turkey, see Shankland (2003).
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Table 2: Estimated Means of Individual Characteristics - (Women 15-64 y.o.)
Rural Urban Total
FLFP 0.4349 0.1945 0.2852
paid 0.1018 0.1383 0.1245
Married 0.6891 0.6691 0.6766
Educ: primary or less 0.8989 0.7335 0.7959
Educ: secondary 0.0857 0.1979 0.1555
Educ: tertiary or more 0.0154 0.0686 0.0485
Age 34.7959 34.1267 34.3792
N 11243 25249 36492
N_pop 8887663 14663541 23551204
in rural Turkey calls for a cautious interpretation and additional analysis.
To provide the reader with a better picture of the distribution of the key variables of this
study at the regional level, Figure 1 plots maps of the distributions of urban FLFP, urban per
capita income, fraction of households with secular consumption patterns, and urbanization.
Joint evaluation of FLFP with the urbanization map at the lower right corner shows that
participation rates are rather low in the most urbanized cities of Turkey, such as Istanbul and
Ankara. This observation is in line with the previous literature which describes the migration
to cities as a driving factor behind falling FLFP rates in Turkey (see Section 2.3). Gündüz-
Hos¸gör and Smits (2008: 110-111) explain the high rates of FLFP in the North by the fact
that husbands from this region usually work in the construction sector in the West, especially
in Istanbul, while their wives run the family farm businesses.
The maps also show that the fraction of households with secular consumption patterns by
regions as well as regional distribution of per capita urban income exhibit similar distributions
as FLFP. Central and eastern parts of Turkey are poorer and contain fewer secular households.
The common thread among these three distributions calls for controlling for income level when
estimating the e¤ect of secularity on FLFP.
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3.3 Method
Following the common practice in the FLFP literature, I provide separate estimates for single
and married women12. Single women are usually younger in age and thus in a position to
choose between school and work. Moreover, a number of factors that a¤ect participation,
such as degree of education, might exert a much stronger e¤ect on single women, as they
are usually more exible in their time use. Similarly, secularity would also a¤ect singles
and married women in varying degrees. As already noted in the Introduction, men tend to
inuence womens participation decisions in conservative households. The male inuence over
womens decisions, however, would depend upon the nature of the relationship. Traditionally,
husbands conservativeness have a stronger e¤ect on FLFP than that of fathers, as it is
easier for the women to say noto the latter. The distinction is so sharp that, prior to an
amendment to the civil law in 1990, married women were even o¢ cially required to have their
husbandspermission to work, a rule that never existed for fathers13. All of these factors
favor running separate estimations for single and married women regarding their economic
participation.
For the married group, I run typical logistic regressions in which the dependent variable
is a dummy indicating labor force participation. This approach is not suitable for single
women, most of whom make joint decisions on educational and labor force participation. For
single women, I use a bivariate probit setting, which I borrow from child-labor literature (see
Day¬o¼glu, 2005, among others) in which employment and schooling decisions are a¤ected by
one another.
The results presented in the next section show the average marginal e¤ects of the regressors
for each equation. An alternative approach would be to report the marginal e¤ects at the
mean values of the explanatory variables. In the estimations, the two methods surprisingly
yield similar results. Nevertheless, I choose not to report marginal e¤ects at means, as they
lack any meaning in estimations which include binary explanatory variables (see Williams,
2012: 324).
In all of the settings, the main explanatory variable of interest is secular, which was
dened in the previous section. The income variables I use, faminc_perc, and non-wage
inc. are per capita income in the household (excluding the female in observation) and non-
12For example, see the studies summarized in Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), Mincers seminal work
(1962), as well as Murphy (1995), Lehrer (1995), Heineck (2004), Gonzales (2004), and Gündüz-Hos¸gör and
Smits (2008).
13For husbandsinuence over womens workforce participation see also Ozyegin (2010), Chapter 2.
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wage income of the female under observation, respectively. These two variables act as proxies
for the reservation wage. The other explanatory variables are the number of children in the
household who are younger than 15 years of age (children), age and its square; the type of
household (i.e. nuclear, patriarchal/large, one adult or people living together), as
well as educational and NUTS1-level regional dummies. The estimations for married women
cover the age group of 15 to 64, while the same range is limited to 15 to 25 for singles.
4 Results
4.1 Married Women
Table 3 shows the estimated marginal e¤ects of explanatory variables for married women
living in urban areas in three di¤erent settings. Almost all of the coe¢ cients in the third and
largest setting, have the expected sign and signicance. If per capita income in the household
excluding the female in estimation increases 10,000 liras per annum14 the probability of labor
force participation decreases around 6 percentage points. The impact of an increase in non-
wage income of the same size is around 2:8 percentage points. The impact of age on FLFP is
also negative and signicant at the margin (with a p value of 0:052).
Having a university degree means a 54 percentage point increase in the probability of
participation, which is strikingly high compared to the e¤ects of other determinants as well
as the e¤ect of education observed in previous studies for other countries. An extra child
within the household reduces the participation rate around 2 percentage points. Living in a
larger household has a positive e¤ect on FLFP, as the sharing of domestic duties with other
household members allows women to work outside of the home.
There are also signicant variations across regions with regard to FLFP. Even after con-
trolling for the other covariates, FLFP rates in Central Anatolia, Central East and South East
remains 3 to 6 percent lower than the Istanbul region. By contrast, in the western regions of
Turkey, urban FLFP is higher. The signicant coe¢ cients of regional e¤ects are in-line the
previous literature on the e¤ects of cultural factors prevailing in these regions (Gündüz-Hos¸gör
and Smits, 2008; and Uraz et al., 2010.)
The coe¢ cient of our main variable of interest, secular, is highly signicant and positive
in all settings. Secularity may inuence FLFP directly as well as indirectly through its e¤ects
on number of children, school attendance, household size, etc. The base model indicates that
14This corresponds to $6,700 approximately at the mean exchange rate of 2003.
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Table 3: Logistic Estimations of FLFP in Urban Areas - Average Marginal E¤ects
(I-Base Dif.) II III
secular 0.097 0.038 0.032
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
faminc_perc -0.060 -0.058
(0.015) (0.015)
non-wage inc. -0.286 -0.279
(0.038) (0.037)
children -0.024 -0.019
(0.003) (0.003)
age/10 -0.004 -0.005
(0.002) (0.002)
educ: secondary 0.077 0.072
(0.010) (0.010)
educ: tertiary 0.541 0.538
(0.023) (0.023)
HH type: large 0.029 0.030
(0.009) (0.008)
West Marmara 0.043
(0.015)
Agean 0.029
(0.012)
East Marmara 0.029
(0.013)
West Anatolia 0.013
(0.011)
Mediterranean 0.034
(0.012)
Central Anatolia -0.053
(0.013)
West Black Sea 0.035
(0.018)
East Black Sea 0.112
(0.020)
North-East -0.007
(0.019)
Central-East -0.029
(0.012)
South-East -0.061
(0.011)
N 16876 16876 17073
Standard errors in parentheses.
Covers married women between 15 and 64 years of age. Base HH type is nuclear.
Base education category is primary school and less. Base region is Istanbul.
Estimations include squared values of income and age.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
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living in a secular household means an almost 10 percentage point increase in the probabil-
ity of labor force participation of married women. After controlling for income, number of
children, age and education, and household type, the di¤erence reduces to 3:8 percentage
points. Adding regional e¤ects narrows the gap only to a minor extent. This result show that
the direct e¤ect of having a secular lifestyle on FLFP is 3:2 percentage points at the most
conservative estimate and it is highly signicant.
The variable coe¢ cients reported in Table 4 concerning rural areas exhibit a di¤erent
pattern than the previous table. The negative e¤ect of family income on FLFP becomes much
stronger. The number of children within the household doesnt a¤ect FLFP signicantly, most
likely because of the larger nature of rural households allows for sharing of child raising duties
among its members. The insignicant coe¢ cient of children may also result from a number
of women executing eld work and child care duties simultaneously. The e¤ect of age at its
mean value is positive, indicating that younger married women in rural areas are more likely
to undertake domestic duties. One puzzling result, however, is the lower participation rates
among women who have secondary educations. A similar result was reached in Hos¸gör and
Smits (2008) and calls for more detailed investigation, including the nature of employment (i.e.
paid/unpaid) at various education levels. Moreover, regional e¤ects become much stronger in
rural area estimations. Most importantly, the sign of secular is reversed and loses some of
its signicance as the estimations switch from urban to rural areas.
The problem with the estimates presented in Table 4 is that they fail to distinguish between
paid and unpaid work. As stated in Section 3, the estimated share of women working unpaid
in family enterprises is 76 percent in rural areas. It is not clear from these results whether the
negative sign of secular is due to its e¤ect on participation for unpaid or paid work. In order
to identify the e¤ect of secularity on paid work, Table 5 reports the estimation results with
the same set of explanatory variables as the previous regressions, however, this time using the
probability of paid employment of women as the dependent variable and combining both urban
and rural areas. The added variable urban both catches the negative e¤ect of urbanization on
paid labor and allows us to report the marginal e¤ects for urban and rural areas separately.
This methodology, however, does not function as a perfect substitute to FLFP estimations,
as it removes the unemployed women from regressions. Nevertheless, conducting separate
estimations for paid work is still useful to interpret the e¤ect of secularity in rural areas.
As reported in Table 5, when FLFP is substituted with the probability of paid employment
as the dependent variable, the coe¢ cient of secular becomes positive both in urban (column
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Table 4: Logistic Estimations of FLFP in Rural Areas - Average Marginal E¤ects
(I-Base Dif.) II III
secular -0.063 -0.042 -0.048
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
faminc_perc -0.219 -0.182
(0.040) (0.038)
non-wage inc. -0.108 -0.380
(0.670) (0.584)
children 0.000 0.005
(0.005) (0.005)
age/10 0.039 0.033
(0.005) (0.005)
educ: secondary -0.100 -0.094
(0.033) (0.033)
educ: tertiary 0.413 0.403
(0.039) (0.041)
HH type: large 0.172 0.143
(0.015) (0.015)
West Marmara 0.295
(0.038)
Agean 0.319
(0.034)
East Marmara 0.185
(0.046)
West Anatolia 0.211
(0.043)
Mediterranean 0.318
(0.034)
Central Anatolia 0.089
(0.048)
West Black Sea 0.478
(0.023)
East Black Sea 0.417
(0.029)
North-East 0.373
(0.036)
Central-East 0.152
(0.053)
South-East 0.253
(0.041)
N 7683 7683 7683
Standard errors in parentheses.
Covers married women between 15 and 64 years of age.
Base education category is primary school and less. Base region is Istanbul.
Estimations include squared values of income and age.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
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Table 5: Logistic Estimations of Paid Employment - Average Marginal E¤ects
Average At urban=0 At urban=1
urban -0.028 -0.028 -0.028
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
secular 0.019 0.017 0.022
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
faminc_perc -0.071 -0.064 -0.081
(0.016) (0.014) (0.018)
non-wage inc. -0.232 -0.212 -0.266
(0.030) (0.028) (0.035)
children -0.009 -0.008 -0.010
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
age/10 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
educ: secondary 0.079 0.073 0.090
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
educ: tertiary 0.578 0.561 0.600
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
HH type: large -0.019 -0.017 -0.022
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
West Marmara -0.008 -0.007 -0.009
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Agean -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
East Marmara 0.018 0.016 0.021
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
West Anatolia -0.016 -0.014 -0.018
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Mediterranean 0.009 0.008 0.011
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Central Anatolia -0.064 -0.058 -0.073
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
West Black Sea -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
East Black Sea 0.044 0.040 0.050
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016)
North-East -0.008 -0.008 -0.010
(0.014) (0.012) (0.016)
Central-East -0.037 -0.033 -0.042
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
South-East -0.046 -0.041 -0.053
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
N 24559 24559 24559
Standard errors in parentheses.
Covers married women between 15 and 64 years of age.
Base education category is primary school and less. Base region is Istanbul.
Estimations include squared values of income and age.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
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II) and rural areas (column III). This switch in the sign of secular between FLFP and
paid work estimations for the rural areas suggest that living in a secular household not only
has a positive e¤ect on womens labor force participation for paid work but also a negative
e¤ect on the probability of unpaid work, which is the common form of female employment in
agriculture.
The estimated positive e¤ect of secularity on paid employment in rural areas also sheds
light on the opposing evidence documented by the micro-econometric studies and anthropo-
logical research, both of which are discussed in Section 2.2. According to these results, the
link between womens paid employment and increased religious activity in certain rural areas
(Hart, 2007; and Isik, 2013) does not represent the general behavior in agricultural households.
In other words, despite the existence of certain communities which use piety as a legitimizing
tool for womens socially unwelcomed employment, the overall e¤ect of keeping a distance
with religiosity on womens paid work remains positive in rural Turkey.
4.2 Single Women
For the group of 15 to 64 year-old single women, the estimated mean age is 18 years. At
this age, reduced participation in the labor force could be favorable as long as it is associated
with increased schooling. The change in the normative interpretation of younger womens
employment calls for an estimation methodology which takes into account joint decisions
on participation in education and work. This section presents the results for paid work
participation and schooling decisions in a bivariate probit setting. The reason behind the
use of paid employment, instead of labor force participation, is to avoid contamination
and subsequent ambiguity caused by the widespread incidence of unpaid work in rural areas,
which was mentioned in the previous sub-section. Nevertheless, in alternative settings which
I do not present here for the sake of brevity, I run similar estimations by choosing labor force
participation as a probable outcome and reach similar results. In all settings, the observed
primary e¤ect of secularity is on schooling decisions, while the impact on employment (or
LFP in general) remains limited at this age group.
As this section contains analyses about the e¤ect of secularity on educational participation,
I limit the age group under study from 15 to 25 years. The upper limit is arbitrary, however,
choosing a di¤erent limit does not have an important e¤ect on the results15. An estimated
15Results for alternative settings are available from the author upon request.
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99:7 percent of single women of this age group are categorized as never married. The
remaining 0.3 percent includes those who are divorced, living separately, cohabiting, and who
lost their husbands.
Table 6: Bivariate Probit Estimation of Participation
paid=0, student=0 paid=1, student=0 paid=0, student=1 paid=1, student=1
urban -0.142 0.040 0.089 0.013
(0.014) (0.009) (0.012) (0.001)
secular -0.085 0.001 0.074 0.010
(0.019) (0.012) (0.019) (0.004)
faminc_perc -0.085 -0.149 0.241 -0.008
(0.042) (0.032) (0.032) (0.007)
non-wage inc -0.812 -0.816 1.637 -0.008
(0.381) (0.245) (0.356) (0.050)
children 0.030 -0.001 -0.026 -0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001)
age/10 0.780 0.230 -1.003 -0.008
(0.026) (0.012) (0.024) (0.004)
N 8523 8523 8523 8523
Standard errors in parentheses.
Covers single women between 15 and 25 years of age.
Explanatory variables include squared values of income and age
as well as dummies on education and region, and HH type.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
Table 6 provides the coe¢ cients for secular and urban as well as the remaining continu-
ous variables (faminc_perc, non-wage inc., children and age) to observe how coe¢ cient
estimations behave. As one might expect, participation rates both in paid labor and education
are signicantly higher in urban areas (4 and 8:9 percentage points, respectively). Secularity
reduces the probability of non-participation 8:5 percentage points; and its e¤ect is also highly
signicant. 7:4 points of this reduction are associated with a signicant increase in schooling.
There is also a small, (1 percentage point) positive e¤ect on dual participation in education
and paid employment.
It is also important to note that a higher number of children under 15 in the household
causes a signicant reduction not only in labor force participation of married women (Table
3), but also in the probability of schooling of single women. Reduced schooling means double
jeopardy for single women, as one of the most important determinants of FLFP in Turkey is
education16.
16See the studies cited in Section 2.3 as well as the results on education provided in Table 3.
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5 Secular or just luxury? Robustness checks
The excise tax on alcohol in Turkey, with $6337:68 per hectoliter excluding the 18% VAT,
is the third highest after Norway and Iceland among OECD countries17. Apart from their
secular nature, alcoholic drinks in Turkey also stand as luxury products as a result of heavy
taxation. Shellsh varieties are already among the most expensive foods in Turkey and the
majority of pet products are rarely a¤ordable for lower-income groups. This section explores
if the inferences drawn in the previous sections, which were based mainly on consumption of
alcoholic drinks but also to a lesser extent of shellsh and pet products, reect the e¤ect of
secularity or instead just luxury consumption habits. The latter would be the case if female
labor force (or educational) participation is a¤ected by the propensity to consume of the
households.
Table 7: Shares of HHs Consuming:
co¤ee 0.16
banana 0.23
dressing 0.19
icecream 0.17
N 107614
To test the extent of the e¤ect of luxury consumption, I picked those foods and beverages
which are deemed secular but at the same time luxurious as placebo goods for the re-
gression settings of the previous section. Four products, namely co¤ee, ice cream, bananas,
and salad dressings, are safe to consume in orthodox Sunni terms, yet are also a¤ordable
for a small share of households. (Table 7). In fact, the appropriateness of these goods as
placebos in the previous sections settings are questionable, as there would be a reverse cau-
sation from a females employment and changing consumption habits towards luxury goods
within a household. In simpler terms, it would be reasonable to expect a female who was
previously out of the labor market to begin buying some luxury products after gaining a job,
which would hardly be the case for alcoholic consumption or pet products. Nevertheless, as
Table 8 presents, the use of these products in FLFP or paid work estimates does not yield
any signicant results despite the possibility of reverse causation.
The rst column in the table shows the results of urban FLFP regressions, while the
dependent variable in the second column represents the probability of paid employment in
17<http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-policy/Table%205.3%20Taxation%20of%20alcoholic%20beverages.xls>,
reached: 28.11.2013
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Table 8: Using Placebo Goods
FLFP in Urban Areas Paid Work in All Areas
co¤ee 0.005 0.002
(0.008) (0.006)
banana 0.001 0.002
(0.007) (0.005)
dressing -0.008 -0.008
(0.007) (0.005)
icecream 0.008 0.000
(0.007) (0.005)
N 16876 24559
Standard errors in parentheses
Covers females between 15 and 64 years of age
The other explanatory variables are as same as Column (III) of Table 3.
all areas. None of the placebo products have signicant coe¢ cients for married women in
either setting. These results reject the existence of a possible link between womens economic
participation and householdstaste for luxury goods.
Table 9: Bivariate Placebo Estimations Using Placebo Goods
paid=0 paid=1 paid=0 paid=1
student=0 student=0 student=1 student=1
co¤ee -0.037 0.003 0.030 0.004
(0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.002)
banana -0.049 0.010 0.033 0.006
(0.015) (0.010) (0.014) (0.002)
dressing -0.030 -0.020 0.050 0.001
(0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.002)
icecream -0.037 -0.005 0.039 0.003
(0.014) (0.009) (0.013) (0.002)
N 8523 8523 8523 8523
Standard errors in parentheses.
Covers females between 15 and 25 years of age.
The other explanatory variables are as same as Table 6.
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
Unlike the results presented for married women, using placebo goods in the bivariate
probit setting for the single women produces some signicant results, as Table 9 shows. As
in the case of the coe¢ cient of secular, consumption of these products are associated with
decreased non-participation (Column I) and increased schooling (Column III). Yet, coe¢ cients
of placebo products remain smaller in magnitude than of secular. These results may suggest
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that part of the positive e¤ect of secularity on educational participation may arise from
the luxurious nature of alcohol, shellsh and pet products consumed in Turkey. If a girls
education is considered to be a luxury good, as Cameron and Worswick (2001) suggest, a
correlation between education and other luxury consumer goods becomes something expected.
Nevertheless, the higher magnitude and signicance level of secular compared to the placebo
goods indicate that there is a combined e¤ect of secularity and luxury for the case of consuming
alcohol, shellsh, and pet products.
6 Conclusion
This study constitutes the rst attempt to use consumption as a signal of household secu-
larity. Three consumer products, alcoholic drinks, shellsh, and pet products are chosen as
secularproducts, i.e. goods that contradict conservative Sunni consumption practices. This
methodology is extendable to any society in which faith-related consumption patterns exist
and helps to relax the data constraints on religious information at the micro-level. Another
important advantage of this methodology is to match household secularity with individual
outcomes, which is useful in cases where the former has an inuence on the latter.
Using information provided in a household budget survey, in this study, I ask whether
haram or makruh has any association with labor market and educational participation de-
cisions of both married and single women in Turkey. My results reveal that living in a
non-religious household has a signicant and positive e¤ect on the labor force participation of
married women in urban areas. The observed e¤ect in rural areas where women work unpaid
as a custom is negative. Further analysis is carried out to show that secular consumption is
associated with an increased probability of paid work for married women in all areas; thus,
the negative impact apparent in agriculture remains as a favorable outcome. Providing sepa-
rate results that consider the rural/urban divide contributes to solving the puzzle of unpaid
agricultural work in a developing-country setting.
Joint estimations on the probability of single womens participation in paid employment
and education also indicate a positive e¤ect of secularity on schooling. However, the results
from the robustness checks which use luxury but at the same time not necessarily secular
placebo products imply that part of the e¤ect on schooling may be a result of the correlation
between two luxury consumption goods; i.e. alcoholic drinks and girlseducation as a luxury
consumption item. Yet, the smaller magnitude and the signicance levels of the coe¢ cients
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of the placebo goods suggest that the estimated positive e¤ect of the secularproducts on
the probability of educational participation is not totally explained by their luxurious nature.
One limitation of this paper arises from the undeclared amount of alcohol consumption in
the household surveys. Existence of households who consume alcohol but do not register this
practice in the questionnaires causes a data contamination in the non-secular group, which
results in a downward bias in the estimations. Therefore, the real e¤ect of secularity on
the womens labor force and on educational participation is potentially much higher than the
estimates provided in this study. As another shortcoming, it was not possible to investigate
the e¤ect of secularity on marriage decisions, because the data does not include information
about pre-marriage characteristics of the households. Any future study accounting for this
factor will give us a fuller understanding of the gendered e¤ects of having a secular lifestyle.
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